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1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider a game of m players. The rules of the game prescribe mappings 
Jk('):f iDi-"*•, k=l  . . . . .  m, 
i= l  
where Jk(') and Dk are the cost function and decision set, respectively, for player k. 
Each player desires to attain the smallest possible cost to himself. In general, there is no 
absolutely cooperative solution (cf. [1-3]). However, in [4], two moods of play were considered, 
one cooperative and the other noncooperative. 
For the cooperative play, according to Pareto, a decision d* is considered as a Pareto-optimal 
if for all 
d ~ f i  Di, 
i= l  
we have either Jk(d)= Jk(d*) for all ke{1 . . . .  ,m} or there exists a ke{1 . . . . .  m} such that 
Jk(d) > Jk(d*). If we regard each Jk as the kth coordinate of a vector, then the above problem 
becomes a problem of vector optimization and is the case we shall consider in Section 3, but in 
a rather general setting. 
For the noncooperative (competitive) play, a decision d* is an equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) 
if and only if for all k ~ { 1 . . . . .  m } we have 
Jk(d*) <<. Jk(d* . . . . .  d*_ ,, dk, d, + l . . . . .  dm 
for all dk ~ Dk. 
Nash equilibria for N-person games were discussed in [5-8]. 
An important class of Nash equilibrium games is that of two-person zero-sum games. These are 
games in which the cost of one player is the negative of the other player's. Thus we have 
Jl(d) = - J2(d) = J(d). Hence, in terms of J(d), player 1 is the minimizing player and player 2 is 
the maximizing one. In this case, we have a saddle-point problem. A decision d*~D~ x D2 is a 
saddle-point if and only if 
J(d*, d2) <~ J(d*, d* ) <~ J(d,, d* ) 
for all d~Dt, d2~D2. 
There is a situation that the two players play many games at a time. Each game is a zero-sum 
game. If the cost of each game is weighted, we can take a linear combination of the cost functions 
to form a new cost function, that is, the games can be treated as one single game. But if the costs 
of the games are not weighted, each player desires to attain the optimal cost for each game to 
himself, then a new equilibrium should be defined. In Section 4, we shall explore a vector 
saddle-point theory which amalgamates the concept of Pareto-optimality and ordinary saddle-point 
theory discussed above. 
In [9] and [I0], from a different viewpoint, saddle-points for vector-valued Lagrangian functions 
were defined. Our definition of a vector saddle-point in Section 4 is a more generalized version than 
that in [9] and [10] which is only suitable for their Lagrangian functions. 
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In Section 5, examples of differential games involving partial differential equations are discussed 
as applications to the theory derived in Section 4. 
2. DEF IN IT IONS AND PREL IMINARY RESULTS 
Let X, Y be locally convex topological vector spaces. D is a closed convex cone in Y which defines 
a partial order ~< in Y in the following sense: 
for y,,y:EY, yl <.y2 if y2-y ,  sD. 
Similarly, as -D  is also a closed convex pointed cone in Y, we can define a partial order I> 
in Yby  yl >~ y: if y2-- y l s -D .  
We assume that intD is nonempty and denote D '= D\{0}. 
For convenience, we also have the following notations: (i) Yl < Y2 if Y2 -Y l  t int  D; (ii) yl ~ Y2 if 
Y2 - Yl ¢int D; (iii) y~ > y: if y: - y~ s int - D; (iv) y~ ~ Y2 if Y2 -- Y~ ¢ int - D. 
Definition 2.1 
Let J :  X ~ Y be a map from X into Y and T s.~(X, Y) be a continuous linear map from X into 
Y. T is said to be a subgradient of J at x s X if 
r(xl -- x) <. Y(xl ) -- J(x) 
for all XlSX. The subdifferential of J at x, denoted by OY(x), is the set of all subgradients of J 
at x. 
Definition 2.2 
A map J :X-~ Y is D-convex if 
J(txl + (1 -- t)x2) <~ tJ(xl) + (1 - t)Y(x:) 
for all tE(0, 1), x~,x2sX. J is strictly D-convex if 
J(txl + (1 - t)x2) < tJ(xl) + (1 - t)J(x2) 
for all t s(0, 1), x~, x~sX and xl ~ x:. Similarly, J is D-concave if 
J(txt + (1 - t)x~) >>. tJ(xt) + (1 - t)J(x2) 
for all t s(0, 1), x~, x:sX. J is strictly D-concave if 
J(txl + (1 - t)x2) > tJ(xl) + (1 - t)J(x2) 
for all ts(0, 1), x~sX and x~ ~x: .  
Definition 2.3 
Let A g Y. a s A is a D-extreme point of A if for any b s A, b ~< a implies b = a. The set of all 
D-extreme point of A will be denoted by ext[A ID]. 
Similarly, asA is a ( -D) -extreme point of A if for any bsA,  b >>. a implies b = a and the set 
of all ( -D) -extreme point of A is denoted by ext[A [D]. 
1.emma 2.4 
(OD - D) f) (int D) = 0. 
Proof. Let a s(0D -D)N( in t  D) and a ffi b - c  where b cOD and c sD. Then b = a + c t int  D 
which contradicts that b cOD. So the intersection is empty. 
With the above lemma, we can show that strictly D-convexity implies strict inequality in the 
definition of subgradient. 
Proposition 2.5 
Let J :X~ Y be strictly D-convex and TsOJ(x). Then for xt # x, 
T(X 1 - -  x )  < J (x I )  - J (x).  
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Proof. Suppose not, then there is an xm eX such that 
J (x~) - J (x )  - T(xt  - x )~OD.  
On the other hand, for te(0,  1), 
J (tx, + (1 - t )x)  - J (x )  - T(tXl + (1 -- t)x -- x )~D,  
i.e. 
hence 
By Lemma 2.4, 
J ( tx  I + (1 - t )x)  - J (x )  - tT(xl -- x )~D,  
t J (x l )  + (1 -- t ) J (x )  -- J(txl + (1 - t )x)etOD - D = OD - D. 
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Replacing h by -h ,  we also have 
Dividing t and letting t-- .  0, we get 
Th ~< J '(x)h. 
J '(x)h ~ Th. 
As h is arbitrary and D is pointed, we conclude that T = J '(x). Hence OJ(x) ffi {J'(x)}. 
If Y is finite dimensional, we Shall see that TeOJ (x)  is a vector whose coordinates are the 
subgradients of the component functions of J. 
Proposition 2. 7 
Let J ( x )  ffi ( J l(x), . . . .  Jm(x)): X --* R" where J~ are convex functions. Let D ffi R~, then Ted J (x )  
if and only if there exist x* = dJk(x), k ffi 1 . . . . .  m, such that T ffi (x* , . . . ,  x*). Thus d J (x)  ~ 0 
if and only if dJk(x) # 0 for all k = 1 . . . . .  m. 
Proof  Let x*~OJk(x),  then for yeX 
<x*, y - x > <~ J~(y) - J , (x) .  
J(txl + (1 -- t )x)  < t J (x j )  + (1 - t ) J (x) ,  
which contradicts the strictly D-convexity of  J. 
The following proposit ion connects the Gateaux derivative and the subdifferential of  D-convex 
function. 
Proposition 2.6 
I f  J :X  --* Y is D-convex and Gateaux differentiable then 
~J(x )  = {J'(x)}. 
Proof  Let x leX ,  xj #x  and 0t < 1, then 
J (txt + (1 - t )x)  ~ t J (xt)  + (1 - t ) J (x) ,  
J (x  + t(x, - x))  - J (x )  
(x~) - J(x). 
t 
As D is closed, letting t--* 0, we have 
J ' ( x ) (x l  - x )  <<. J (x l )  - J (x ) .  
Thus J ' (x )eOJ (x ) .  
Conversely, let Ted J (x ) ,  h EX  and t > 0, we have 
tTh = T(x  + th - x )  
J (x  + th) - J (x ) .  
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Then if T = (x* . . . . .  x*), 
i.e. T~c3J(x). 
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T(y - x) ~ J (y ) - J (x ) ,  
Conversely, let TEOJ(x)wi th  T= (x* , . . .  ,x*),  then for yeX,  
J (y )  - J (x)  - T(y - X)~Rm+, 
i.e. 
Thus x* Et3kJ(x ). 
Jk(Y) -- Jk(x) -- (X*, y -- X)  >>. O. 
3. NECESSARY AND SUFF IC IENT CONDIT IONS FOR 
CONE-EXTREMAL PROBLEMS 
Let U be a closed convex subset in X and J :X  ~ Y be D-convex. The problem (P), 
ext[{S(x) [ x ~ U}ID], 
is to find x ~ U such that J(x)~ext[J(U)[D]i The set of "extremal values" of (P) will be denoted 
by ext(P). 
The following sufficient condition of x ~ U to be a solution of (P) is analogous to that of scalar 
convex programming. 
Theorem 3.1 
Let x ~ U. If there exists T~OJ(x) such that 
T(x - xt)~kD" 
for all x~¢ U, then J(x)~ext(P). 
Proof Suppose J(x)¢ext(P), then there is an x~U such that J(xO <. J (x)  and J ( x~)~J (x ) .  
Hence 
By definition of T, 
Therefore 
J ( x ) - J (xOcD' .  
J(xO - J (x)  - T(xl - x )eD.  
T(x - x t )¢ J (x)  - J(xl) + D 
=_D'+D 
~_D, 
as D is pointed, and there is a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.2 
If J is D-convex and Gateaux differentiable, then a sufficient condition for x ~ U to be a solution 
of (P) is 
J ' ( x ) (x  - x , )¢D" 
for all x~ ~ U. 
Theorem 3.3 
Let J be strictly D-convex and x¢  U. If there exists T~OJ(x) such that 
T(xl -- X) < 0 
for all x~ e U, then x is a solution of (P). 
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Proof If not, there is an x,e U such that J(xl)~< J(x) and xl # x. By Proposition 2.5, 
T(xl - x) < J(xl) - J(x) <<. O, 
which leads to contradiction. 
Lemma 3.4 
Let T~.Y(X, Rm), U be a closed convex subset of X, D = R~ and x~U. Then the following 
statements are equivalent: (i) T(u - x) ~ 0 for all u e U; (ii) there exist 24 I> 0, k = 1 . . . . .  m, not 
all zeros, such that 
~ 2kT~(u--x)>>.O 
kwl  
for all u e U. 
Proof Let A = Tx -D  and B = T(U). Then (i) is equivalent to (int A)NB = 0. By separation 
theorem, it is equivalent to that there exists a nonzero 2 ~ R" such that 
<2, ru)  ~> <2, Tx -h )  
for all u ~ U and h eD. Put u = x, we have 2 eD'. If we put h = 0, the inequality in (ii) is obtained. 
Conversely, suppose (ii) is true, then 24 I> 0 implies (2, h)  I> 0 for all h ~D, and the inequality 
implies (2, Tu) >1 (2, Tx) for all uEU. Thus (2, Tu) >>. (2, Tx -h )  for all ueU and heD, i.e. 2 
separates A and B. 
Combining Proposition 2.7, Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 3.5, we can easily obtain the following 
result of variational inequality. 
Theorem 3.5 
Let Y = R", D = R'~, J be strictly R~-convex. Then a sufficient condition for x e U to be a Pareto 
optimal of (P) is that there exist nonnegative numbers 2t . . . . .  2,., not all zeros, and 
x*~dJ4(x), k = 1, . . . ,  m such that 
~ 2k(X'~U--X)>~O foral l  ueU. (3.1) 
k-I 
It can be easily seen that the variational inequality (3.1) can be written in the form: 
0E210Jl(X) .-~ " " .Jc A m OJm(X ) + N(x I U), (3.2) 
where N(x [ U) denotes the normal cone of U at x. Thus a sufficient condition for x e U to be a 
solution of (P) is that (3.2) holds for some nonnegative numbers 2j . . . . .  2,, such that not all of 
them are zeros. 
When (P) is unconstrained, i.e. U = X, then a sufficient condition is 
o~2, 07~(x) +... + Am OJ,.(x) 
for some nonnegative numbers 21 . . . . .  2,,, not all zeros. 
In fact, even without the finiteness of the dimension, (3.2) is also a necessary condition. 
Moreover, the convexity of J is not necessarily strict. 
Theorem 3.6 
Let J =(dl . . . . .  J,,): X --* R" be R~-convex. If x e U is a Pareto optimal of d on U, then there 
exist nonnegative numbers 21 . . . . .  2~,, not all zeros, such that (3.2) holds. 
Proof We first claim that x minimize dl on the set 
{u ~ u Isk(u) ~< Jk(x), I¢ = 2 . . . . .  m}. 
I f  not, there will be a u ~ U such that 
Jl(u) < J i(x) 
and 
J4(u)<~Jk(x ) for k=2 . . . . .  m. 
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Thus, J(u)<<. Y(x) and J (u )~ Y(x) which contradicts that Y(x)¢ext(P). Hence x is an optimal 
solution of the problem: 
minimize J(u) 
subject o u ~ U 
and Jk(u)--Jk(x)<<.O, k=2 . . . .  ,m. 
Then from [11] there exist nonnegative constants 2k k = 1 , . . . ,  m, not all zeros, such that 
0~10Jl(x) + ~ xk o(d(.) - d(x))(x) + N(xIU) 
k=2 
= ~ 2~ OJk(x) + N(x I U). 
k=1 
We now go back to our general cases. If Y is not finite-dimensional, wecan still have a necessary 
and sufficient condition in this form but we need a stronger assumption on 3". 
Theorem 3. 7 
If J is strictly D-convex and Gateaux differentiable, and x ~ U, then J(x)~ext(P) if and only if 
J ' ( x ) (x l -x )~O forall xteU. 
Proof. By Proposition 2.6 and Theorem 3.3, the last variational inequality is a sufficient condition 
for x to be a solution. Therefore it remains to prove that it is also a necessary condition. 
Suppose j(x)eext(P). Let x~ ~ U and xt # x, 0t < 1, then 
x + t(xl -- x) = txl + (1 -- t)x ~ U. 
Thus 
J(x) - J(tx~ + (1  - t)x) 
eD, 
t 
(hence ¢int D). As the complement of int D is closed, letting t ~0,  we have J ' (x)(x -x l )¢ in t  D, 
and hence the result. 
When applying Theorem 3.7 to finite-dimensional cases, a result of variational inequality can 
easily be obtained. 
Theorem 3.8 
Let Y = R", D = R~, J be strictly D-convex and Gateaux differentiable, then x e U is a Pareto 
optimal of (P) if and only if there exist nonnegative numbers 21 . . . . .  2,,, not all zeros, such that 
the following generalized variational inequality holds for all u ~ U: 
).j 'k(x)(u - x) >I O. 
kml  
It should be pointed out that when D = R~, the Pareto optimals of (P) are generalized minimals. 
If we choose J to be D-concave (i.e. (-D)-convex) and consider the problem (P') 
extt{S(x)lx Eu} I n'_l 
then the Pareto optimals are generalized maximals. 
Theorem 3.9 
Let Y = R m, J be strictly R~-concave and Gateaux differentiable, then x ~ U is a Pareto optimal 
of (P ' ) i f  and only if there exist nonnegative numbers Pl . . . . .  p,,, not all zeros, such that the 
following variational inequality holds for all u e U: 
~j'~(x)(u - x)  <~ o. 
k- I  
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4. VECTOR SADDLE-POINTS 
With the results in Section 3, we can now extend the scalar saddle-point theory to a vector 
version. 
Definition 4.1 
Let X), X: and Y be locally convex topological spaces. Y is partially ordered by closed convex 
cones D and -D  as in Section 3. Let Um and U2 be dosed convex sets in X, and X2 respectively. 
A point (xt,x:)¢Ul x U2 is a vector saddle-point of a map J :XjxX2.-+Y on U, x U2 if 
J(x), x2)eAl NA2 where 
and 
A, = ext[{J(ul, x2) I ut e Ui } [ D ] 
A2 = ext[{J(xt, u2)lu2e U~}I -D]  
Definition 4.2 
The first partial subdifferential of J at (xt, x2), denoted by d ~d(xt, x2) consists of all T e ~(X~, Y) 
such that 
T(x - x,) <~ J(x, x2) - J(x,, x2) 
for all x eXt. 
The second partial superdifferential of J at (x,, x2), denoted by ~9£J(xt, x2) is the set of all 
Te.W(x2, Y) such that 
T(x - x2) >I J(xl, x) - J(xl, x2) 
for all x e X2. 
It is easy to realize similar definitions for d~J(xt, x2) and di-J(xt, x2). With these definitions, 
existence theorems can be easily obtained. 
Theorem 4.3 
Let (xm, x2)eUi x U2. If there exist T,~O~J(xt, x2) and T2~d~J(x,, x2) such that 
Tl (x l -uO¢D'  forall ul~Um 
and 
T2(x2-u2)~D' forall u2¢U2, 
then (xt, x2) is a vector saddle-point of J on Ut x U2. 
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1. 
Lemma 4.4 
If J(xt, x2) is D-concave and Gateaux differentiable in X2, then O~J(xm, x2) = {J~ (x~, x2)} where 
J~(xt, x2) is the Gateaux derivative with respect o the second coordinate. 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.6. 
Thus if J is coordinatewise differentiable, then Theorem 4.3 can be stated in the form: 
Theorem 4.5 
Let J(x~, x2) be D-convex in X~ and D-concave in X2 and J is Gateaux differentiable with respect 
to each coordinate. If (x,, x2)eU) x U2 satisfies 
J~(xt,x2)(xt-ttt)~D' forall ul~Ui 
and 
J~(xl,x2)(x2--u,)¢--D" forall u, eU~, 
then (xt, x2) is a vector saddle-point of J on Ut × U2. 
C.A,M.W.A. LB/I-~==-N 
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Proof It is a corollary of Theorem 4.3 using Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 2.6. 
With strictly D-convexity and D-concavity, Theorem 3.3 is applicable. 
Theorem 4.6 
Let J(x,, x2) be strictly D-convex in x~ and strictly D-concave in x2. If(x~, x2)~ UI x Us and there 
exist T~eO~-J(x~, x2) and T2~O~J(x~, xs) such that 
Tl(ul--Xl)<O foral l  ul~U1 
and 
T:(u2-xs)>O foral l  u2eU~, 
then (x,, x2) is a vector saddle-point of J on Ui × Us. 
Again, addition of differentiability gives us necessary and sufficient condition for 
(xl, x2)~ Uj × Us to be a vector saddle-point. 
Theorem 4. 7 
If we further assume that J is Gateaux differentiable with respect to each coordinate in Theorem 
4.6, then (xl, x~)~ U~ × Us is a vector saddle-point of J on U1 x Us if and only if 
J~(xt,x2)(x~-u~)<O foral l  u~U~ 
and 
J~(x~,x.,)(xs-u:)>O forall  u2~U2. 
Proof Apply Theorem 3.7. 
If we set Y = ~" and D = ~,  the vector saddle-point can be termed as Pareto saddle-point and 
it is characterized as follows. 
Theorem 4.8 
In Theorem 4.6, let Y = R ~ and D = R~, then a necessary and sufficient condition for 
(xt, x2)~ U~ x U2 to be a Pareto saddle-point is that there exist nonnegative numbers 2~ . . . . .  Am, 
not all zeros, X*~d~Jk(xl, X2), k = 1 , . . . ,  m, such that 
• 2k(X*,Ul--Xl)>>-O foral l  u,~Ui, 
k=l  
and there exist nonnegative numbers #~ . . . . .  #,,, not all zeros, 
1 . . . . .  m, such that 
~#k(Y* ,  Us-- Xs) <<, 0 for all u~vUs, 
kffil 
where 
~-Jk (xl, xs) = {x * e X* l (x *, y - xl ) <~ J(y, xs) - J (xl, x2) 
and y~Jk (x l ,  x2), k -- 
Vy c Xt } 
and 
~Jk(x l ,  x2) = {x* ~x*l(x*, y - x2) >>. J(x~, y)  - J (x, ,  x2) Vy ~Xs}. 
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6. 
Theorem 4.9 
In Theorem 4.7, let Y= R '~ and D = R~, then a necessary and sufficient condition for 
(xj ,xs)6U, × Us to be a Pareto saddle-point is that there exist nonnegative numbers 
2, . . . . .  2m, #t . . . . .  #,~, both ).ks and #kS are not all zeros, such that the following two variational 
inequalities hold for all ul E U~ and use U2: 
~ 2kJ'k.l(Xl, X2)(Ut -- Xl) >I O, (4.1) 
k- I  
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~l~kJ'k.2(xj, x2)(u2 -- x2) ~< 0, (4.2) 
k=!  
where J'kj(x~, x2) is the Gateaux derivative of the kth component of J with respect o x~ at (x~, x2). 
Proof. Apply Theorems 3.8 and 3.9. 
5. APPLICATION TO D IFFERENTIAL  GAMES 
In this section, we consider the distributed parameter differential games as applications of the 
theory developed in Section 4. 
5.1. Problem statement 
Let f2_~R n be open with a sufficient smooth boundary F. te]0, T[, with T < oo, denotes time. 
We set Q = f) x ]0, T [ and Z = F x ]0, T [. The controls will be denoted by f and g. Fad _ F and 
G,d --~ G represent the sets of admissible controls in Hilbert spaces F and G. 
Let x eft  denote the space variable and the state of the game corresponding to controls f, g be 
denoted by u(f, g) = u(t, x; f, g). 
We are given Hilbert spaces V and I. V' is the dual space of V. We assume V ~_ I c_ V" with 
I as the pivot space. All injections are continuous and all inclusions are densa. 
A family of bilinear forms a(t; #, v), re]0, T[, is given on V. We assume that (1) V#, v~V, the 
function t ~ a(t; #, v) is measurable on ]0, T[ and (2) there exist c, 2, ~t > 0 such that 
[a(t;/~,v)l~c[l#l[vl[Vllv and a( t ;g , /~)+ ~.[l#ll~>0til#il:r 
for all #, ve V and te]0, T[. 
For each t~]0, T[, we may write 
where A (t)p ~ V'. Thus 
We denote 
a(t; #, v) = (A(t)la, v), 
A(t)E.~(L2(O, T; V); L2(0, T; V')). 
V , dr } W(O, T)= rlreL2(O, T; ) -~t~L2(O, T; g') , 
then W(O, T) is a Hilbert space with the norm 
dr 
])r ])wco.,~=(forl, r(t)ll~dt + for -~ :rdt) '/2. 
Theorem 5.1.1 [12] 
Under the above hypothesis, the evolution problem 
{ ~t+(t )u=f  +g, f,g¢L2(O,T; V'), 
u(O) = Uo, Uo~l, 
admits a unique solution in W(O, T). Furthermore, the solution is linear in f, g and Uo, and depends 
continuously on f, g and Uo. 
5.2. Distributed parameter differential games 
We now consider a differential game described by 
du 
dt + A(t)u = Blf + B2g, u(f, g)],,o- u0, u(f,g)cLZ(O, T; V), 
where 
B~e.~(F; L 2(O, T; V')), B2~.~(G ; L 2(O, T; V')). 
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By Theorem 5.1.1, u(f,g) can be sought in the form 
u(f, g) = u~(f ) + u2(g) + u3(uo), 
where urn, u2 and u3 are continuous linear operators. 
Let the cost function of the game be 
J ( f ,  g) = (J, (f, g) . . . . .  Jm(f, g)), 
where Jk ( f , g) = Lk [I Su ( f , g) - Uk.d []~ + ( Mk f , f >e -- < Nk g, g>o, k = 1 . . . . .  m, are the compo- 
nents of J(f,g). We seek a Pareto saddle-point ( f * ,g* )  of J(f,g). We assume that, for 
k = 1 . . . . .  m, Lk are positive constants, Uk, d are given elements in a Hilbert space 
H, S e.oq'(W(0, T); H), Mk~.~(F, F) and Nks.~q'(G, ) such that each Jk(f, g) is strictly convex in 
f and strictly concave in g. Thus Theorem 4.9 is applicable. 
Theorem 5.2. I
Assume that Fad and Gad are closed convex. ( f  *, g*)~Fad × Gad is a pair of Pareto saddle-points 
of J(f,  g) if and only if there exist nonnegative numbers 2m . . . . .  ~.m, not all zeros, and nonnegative 
numbers #1 . . . . .  #m, not all zeros, such that 
Ak{L~(Su(f*,g*) -- Uk.d, Sum(f) -- Sum(f*)>,+ (Mkf* , f  --f*>F} >10 (5.2.1) 
kffil 
for all fEF~d and 
#k{Lk(Su(f *,g*) -- Uk.d, Su2(g) - Su2(g*)>,- <Nkg*, g --g*>o} ~< 0 (5.2.2) 
k=l 
for all g s Gad. 
We introduce a family of adjoint states by 
d 
---~tPk(f, g) + A *(t)p,(f, g) = LkS*A [Su(f, g) - Uk,d], (5.2.3) 
pk(T;f,g) ffiO, p(f,g)cL~(O, T; V), (5.2.4) 
for k = 1 . . . . .  m, where A is a canonical isomorphism of H onto H' and S* is the adjoint operator 
of S. Then Theorem 5.1.1 asserts the existence and uniqueness of solutions Pk(f,g) in W(0, T). 
Put fffif* and g fig* in (5.2.3) and (5.2.4), multiply the left-hand side of (5.2.3) by 
u~(f)- u~(f*) and integrate over ]0, T[. Using integration by parts and noting that 
du,(f___._~) + A(t)ul(f) = B,f, u,(f)[,.o = O, 
dt 
we obtain 
for ( - -dpk( f  *, g*) + A *(t )Pk(f *, g*))(u,(f ) -- um(f *)) dt f0 T ffi (,,Pk ( f  *, g*), Bl ( f - f * )>vdt  
-- <A Tm B*pk(f *, g*), f - f *>e, 
where A~ is a canonical isomorphism of F onto F' and B* is the adjoint operator of B~. On the 
other hand, 
f :  <L kS*A[Su(f*, *) - ( f )  - ( f*) )  dt g Uk.d], Ul U! V 
= Lk(Su(f*,g*) - Uk.d, Sul(f) -- Sum(f*)>,. 
Thus (5.2.1) may be written as 
Ak(A~mB*pk(f*,g*)+ Mkf* , f  --f*)F>~O Vf~Fad. (5.2.5) 
k- I  I 
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Similarly, (5.2.2) may be written as 
I~k< A ~l B*pk ( f  *, g *) -- Nkg*, g --g*>6 ~< 0 
kff i l  
We have thus proved the following result: 
Vg E Gad. (5.2.6) 
Theorem 5.2.2 
Under the condition of Theorem 5.2.1, ( f * ,  g*)~F,a x Gad is a pair of Pareto saddle-points of 
J if and only if there exist nonnegative numbers 21 . . . . .  Am, not all zeros, and nonnegative numbers 
Pl . . . . .  /~m, not all zeros, such that (5.2.3)-(5.2.6) are satisfied for k = 1 , . . . ,  m. 
Note that we have used the favourable condition that each component Jk of J is a differentiable 
function and thus J is a differentiable map from F x G into R m. In general, the objectives Jk are 
not necessarily differentiable. But in some cases, Theorem 4.3 can be applied. Before the discussion 
of these cases, we give some examples for the more ideal case. 
5.3. Example of the game with distributed controls 
Let V = H0~(fl), F = G = L2(Q), BI = B~ = identity map, A(t)  be defined as follows: 
8[ °ul' x j A (t)u = - -- ao(t, x) 
idffi I 
where ag~L~(fl) and there exists ~ > 0 such that 
i j -1  i=1 
a.e. in Q, ~j~R. Thus A (t) is a second order elliptic differential operator. 
The state of the game is given by 
du 
ot+A( t )u=f+g,  in Q, 
ulz=O, u(O,x)fuo(X), xe~. 
Take S = injection map of L2(O, T; V )~ L~(Q), then H = L2(Q) and A = identity map. The cost 
function is 
with 
Y(f,  g)  = (Y, ( f ,  g),  • • •, Jm(f,  g)), 
f0'  Jk( f ,g)  = Lk (u(f, g) -- Uk,a)2dx dt + <Mkf, f>L:(O ~ -- <Nkg, g>L2(Q). 
The family of adjoint states (5.2.3), (5.2.,1) reduce to 
•Pk 
- S--i- + A *(t)Pk = Lk(U -- Uk.a) in Q, 
Pk[z =0, pk(T,x)----O, X~fl  
and (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) reduce to 
2k<Pk(f*,g*) + Mkf* , f  --f*>L2~Q> I 0 
k- I  
~ l~k(Pk(f*, g*) -- Nkg*, g -- g*>L'~O) <~ 0 
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Example of the game with boundary controls 
Let V = HI(~), F = G = L2(2~), BI = B2 = identity map. The state of the game is given by 
0u 
O---i+A(t)u=O, in Q, 
where  
Ova a 0 cos(v, xi), 
i,j= I 
v being the normal at F exterior to ft. 
Let S = injection map of L2(0, T; V)--,L2(Q). Then the cost function is 
J ( f ,  g) = (Jr(f, g) . . . . .  Jm(f, g )) 
Jk( f ,g)  = Lk (u( f ,g )  -- uk.a)2dx dt + (Mkf ,  f )L~z) -- (Nkg, g)L2t~)" 
The family of adjoint states is then given by 
•Pk 
- -  O-"t- + A*(t)pk = Lk(u -- Uk,a) in Q, 
and (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) reduce to 
OPk 
- -  = O, on  Z', 
OVA* 
p(T, x) = O, x ef~ 
2k (pk+mkf* ) ( f - - f * )dY~>~O Vf~Fad, 
k=l 
#k (pk--Nkg*)(g--g*)dY~<~O VgeG,d. 
ks l  
5.5. A partial differentiable case 
For the differential game described in Section 5.2, let Jk(f, g) be defined as follows: 
Jk(f, g) = Zk [I Su(f ,  g) - Uk.d[I ~ + Mk( f )  -- Nk(g), 
where Mk:F--*R and Nk:G~R are continuous strictly convex functions (not necessarily 
differentiable) with nonempty subdifferentials. 
Lemma 5.5.1 
Let h and g be continuous convex functions from X into R where h is Gateaux differentiable. 
Then 
O(h + g)(x) = h'(x) + Og(x). 
Proof By the Moreau-Rockafellar theorem, 
~(h + g)(x) = ah(x) + Og(x) 
= h'(x) + ag(x). 
Then by Theorem 4.8 and Lemma 5.5.1, we have the following result. 
0u 
- -=f+g,  on E, 
OvA 
u(0, x)  = Uo(X), x ~f~, 
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Theorem 5.5.2 
Let ( f * ,  g* )~F~ x Gad. Then ( f * ,  g*) is a Pareto saddle-point o f  J i f  and only if there exist 
nonnegative numbers Al . . . . .  A,,, not all zeros, ~EOMk(f*) ,  k = 1 . . . . .  m, such that 
~k{Lk<Su(f*,g*)--uk.~,SUl(f)--Su,(f*)>H-k<~k,f--f*>}>~O Vf~Fad, (5.5.1) 
k=l  
and there exist nonnegative numbers #~ . . . . .  #~, not all zeros, r/k~C~Nk(g* ), k = 1 . . . .  , m, such that 
~ #k{Lk<Su(f*,g*) -- Uk,d, Su2(g)-  Su2(g*)>,- <~h,g -g*>} ~< 0 Vg6Gad. (5.5.2) 
k=l  
Introducing adjoint  states (5.2.3) and (5.2.4), var iat ional  inequalit ies (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) reduce 
to 
Ak(A~lB'~Pk(f*,g *) + ~k,f - - f * )  >1 0 V f  ~Fad 
k=l  
and 
• #k<A~B~pk(f  *,g *) - tlk,g -g* )  ~< 0 VgeGad. 
k=l  
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